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Smiglecius on entia rationis1 
GINO RONCAGLIA 
 
This paper deals with the discussion of impossible entities in the Logica written by the 
Polish Jesuit Martinus Smiglecius (1564-1618). Two preliminary sections give some 
information on Smiglecius' life and works, and on the general structure of his Logica. A 
third section offers some historical background on the logical status of impossible 
entities, and their inclusion in the class of entia rationis. The fourth and main section 
presents Smiglecius' ideas on this topic in some detail. 
 
1. THE LIFE AND WORKS OF MARTINUS SMIGLECIUS 
Born in Lvov (Leopolis) probably in 1564, Smiglecius was the most important 
Polish philosopher working between the end of the 16th and the beginning of the 17th 
century. He began his studies in his native town, but soon the prominent Polish 
humanist and politician Jan Zamojski took him under his wing, paying for Smiglecius' 
education first at the Jesuit school of Pultusk, and later in Rome, where Smiglecius 
entered the Jesuit order (1581). It was probably on that occasion that he assumed the 
name (taken from the town of Smigle, where his family originated from) by which he 
was to be known: earlier he used the name of Lwowczyk, or Leopolitanus (from his 
native town). Smiglecius studied in Rome until 1586, then he went back to Poland, 
where he took his master's degree in philosophy at the recently established Academy of 
Vilnius.2 
                                            
1 I do not read Polish, and, since much of the existing secondary literature on Smiglecius is in 
Polish, this paper could not have been written without the kind help of Aleksandra Kralkowska, 
Librarian of the Polish Academy in Rome, and of Ewa Joanna Kaczynska. I am also indebted to 
Cesare Cozzo, who - with his abitual kindness and insight - has provided me with many useful 
comments on the first draft of this paper, and to Felicity Lutz for the revision of the English 
text. 
2 The college of Vilnius became a university academy between 1578 and 1579; cf. K. 
Drzymala, "Marcin Smiglecki TJ (1563-1618)", in Studia Historyczne XXI, 1978, pp. 25-43, p. 
29. 
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In Vilnius Smiglecius also became a doctor of theology (1594), and taught both 
philosophy (for 4 years) and theology (for 10 years). Smiglecius was also actively 
involved in the administrative and institutional life of the Academy, as well as in the 
cultural and educational policies of the Jesuit order: he was among the members of the 
commission which had to refer on the project of the Ratio Studiorum sent from Rome. 
For Smiglecius, this was also a period of active participation in religious controversies, 
and his fame as a polemicist spread when, in 1594, he had a two-day public disputation 
with Jan Licyniusz, a supporter of Arianism. At the end of the disputation, Licyniusz 
gave in, declaring himself unable to resist the arguments of his opponent: as a result, 
twelve of the town's most influential noblemen abjured Arianism. In subsequent years 
Smiglecius was increasingly involved in an exchange of polemical writings with Arians, 
Socinians, Lutherans and Calvinists on subjects such as the divinity of Christ and the 
duties and powers of the priests. 
The Jesuit order profitted from Smiglecius' organizational and polemical 
abilities, sending him where the need was felt to raise the level of studies and to re-
organize colleges: thus, Smiglecius spent the last two decades of his life working in the 
colleges of Pultusk, Poznan, Kraków and Kalisz. He died in Kalisz on July 28, 1618. 
His tomb was in the town's monastic church, and in 1650, during restoration work on 
the church, his ashes were placed in a separate urn, with the whole alphabet written on it 
as a symbol of his wisdom.3 
                                            
3 The above-summarized information on Smiglecius' life is mainly drawn from the following 
sources: L. Moreri, Le grand dictionnaire historique, 18th edition, t. 8, Amsterdam, 1740, pp. 
306-307; Augustin and Alois de Backer, Bibliothèque des écrivains de la Compagnie de Jésus, 
ser. VI, Liège 1861, pp. 342-345, integrations in Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus, 
nouvelle édition par C. Sommervogel, p. I t. VII, Bruxelles-Paris 1896, coll. 1320-1327; K. 
Drzymala, Marcin Smiglecki... cit.; I. Dambska, "Kilka uwag o Marcinie Smigleckim i jego 
Logice", in Studia i Materialy z Dziejów Nauki Polskiej, seria E vol. V (1973), pp. 3-27; W. 
Voisé, "The Career of a Polish neo-Aristotelian: Smiglecius", in Archives Internationales 
d'Histoire des Sciences XXIX (1979), pp. 23-27. 
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Twenty-three works attributed to Smiglecius are listed in Sommervogel's 
edition of the Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus.4 A shorter list is given in the 
bibliography at the end of the recent critical edition of the Commentaria in Organum 
Aristotelis, a formerly unpublished logical compendium written by a Vilnius student, 
Stanislaus Bedensky, under Smiglecius' supervision.5 Smiglecius' major works are: the 
De fenore et contractu redimibili, censibus, communi quaestu, conductionibus, 
locationibus et monopolio brevis doctrina, first published in Polish (Vilnae 1596), and 
of great interest for the history of economic and social ideas in Poland,6 which had more 
than ten editions, the last three of which were printed in Vilnius in the 1750s (1752, 
1753 and 1758); the Nodus Gordius sive de Vocatione Ministrorum disputatio, 
Cracoviae 1609, which had editions in Germany (Ingolstadii 1613 and Coloniae 1622) 
and which gave rise to heated polemics between Smiglecius and Protestant authors 
(among those who were involved in the debate, writing refutations or discussions of 
Smiglecius' work, were Johannes Volkel, Valentin Smalcius, Andreas Reuchlin, 
Jacobus Zaborowski, Johannes Bissendorft); the Nova monstra novi Arianismi, Nissae 
1612, which was the object of a long polemic between Smiglecius and Valentin 
Smalcius; and finally the Logica, published in Ingolstadt in 1618 (the epistula 
dedicatoria is dated 1616), which had three English editions: Oxoniae 1634, 1638 and 
1658.7 
 
2. SMIGLECIUS' LOGICA 
                                            
4 Bibliothèque de la Compagnie de Jésus cit., coll. 1320-1327. 
5 Martinus Smiglecius, Commentaria in Organum Aristotelis, ed. by Ludwik Nowak, Textus et 
studia historiam philosophiae ac theologiae in Polonia excultae spectantia, vol. XXII fasc. 1-2, 
Warszawa 1987, pp. 253-257. 
6 Cf. K. Drzymala, "Traktat Marcina Smigleckiego O Lichwie Y O Wyderkach, Czynszach, 
Spolnych Zarobkach, Najmach, Arendach Y Samokupstwie, Krótka Nauka", in Studia i 
Materialy 1972, pp. 143-172. 
7 The 1634 edition is given as printed in Kraków in W. Risse, Bibliographia logica, Hildesheim 
1965, p. 131. I could not find a copy of this edition, but all the other references I found give it as 
published in Oxford. 
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The Logica is a collection of eighteen disputations, subdivided into 185 
questions. The first edition of the text having been published in Ingolstadt in 1618 (the 
year of Smiglecius' death), this book seems to be the very last published by the author 
during his lifetime. This is interesting, since the study of logic still used to be 
chronologically the first in the university curriculum of the time, and the teaching of 
logic was usually one of the first steps in the university career of young professors. 
Smiglecius was no exception to this rule, since he taught logic at the very beginning of 
his career in Vilnius. We have what is probably a good testimony of his teaching at that 
time in the form of the afore-mentioned commentary to Aristotle's Organon written in 
1586 by Stanislaus Bedensky "sub insigni doctrina, pietate et integritate, clarissimo viro 
Martino Smiglecio".8 It is interesting to compare this text with the later Logica. While 
one can safely assume that in writing the Logica Smiglecius used much of the material 
already present in his Vilnius teaching,9 the Logica does not appear to be a simple re-
elaboration of this material. Thus - even if this can be explained by the need to follow 
Aristotle's (and Porphirius') text more closely - hardly anything corresponding to the 
first two disputations of the Logica can be found in the Commentaria. 
The Logica should therefore be regarded as a mature work, probably composed 
over a long period of time10 and resulting from the author's lasting interest in the subject 
he was dealing with. This impression is also confirmed by the complex history of its 
publication. The Logica (or at least the first part of it) was already completed in 1615, 
                                            
8 Martinus Smiglecius, Commentaria... cit., p. 21. 
9 Cf. I. Dambska, Kilka uwag... cit., p. 4. 
10 It may be interesting to observe that Smiglecius, as a prominent member of the Polish 
delegation to the Jesuit general congregation in 1608, asked how far the teaching of philosophy 
could deviate from Aquinas' views. The answer was given by Cardinal Aquaviva: one should 
not deviate from Aquinas' views when they are clearly expressed in Aquinas' own writings and 
are generally accepted by the subsequent commentators, but one is allowed to do so on the more 
dubious matters, where the opinions of the commentators are divided (cf. K. Drzymala, Marcin 
Smiglecki cit., p. 36). This question is not necessarily connected with Smiglecius' own 
philosophical activity, but if some connection exists, then it may well be with the preparatory 
work for the Logica. 
5 
and, as customary, Smiglecius sent it to Rome for approbation. But the opinion of the 
specially appointed censorship commission was not a positive one:  
Legimus Logicam P. Martini Smiglecii: et censemus ut nunc est, non 
debere; quoniam continet opiniones non admodum receptas, vel etiam 
auditas in scholis; atque satis communiter auctores pro illis non 
citat.11 
The enclosed censurae generales to Smiglecius' book approved by the 
commission are the following:  
1. Sequitur aliquas opiniones parum receptas in scholis nostris. 2. Non 
citat auctores pro dictis opinionibus; et cum aliquando citat auctores 
non notat eorum loca; et interdum etiam non satis fideliter eorum dicta 
refert. 3. Non videtur interdum ipse secum cohaerere, ut ex 
particularibus censuris patebit.12 
One of the members of the commission, Johannes Lorinus, observed in a letter 
that the criticisms raised were so fundamental that it was almost impossible for 
Smiglecius to re-elaborate his work in such a way as to make it suitable for 
publication.13  
Despite this, Smiglecius did not give in: we do not know how far he had to 
modify his book to meet the requests of the censorship committee,14 but in June 1616 he 
managed to obtain the approbatio of Stanislaus Gawronski, delegate of the Jesuit order 
for Poland. The book, however, was only published two years later - which may (or 
may not) indicate some further difficulties. 
                                            
11 Quoted in L. Nowak, "Logika Marcina Smigleckiego w opinii wspólczesnynch i 
pózniejszych", in Ruch Filozoficzny XXVI/3 (1968), pp. 219-222, p. 221. One of the four 
members of the commission did not agree with this opinion, and presented a separate report. 
12 Quoted ivi, p. 222. Apparently, the commission examined only the first part of Smiglecius' 
work, "usque ad praedicamentum relationis exclusive". 
13 Ibid. 
14 A detailed study of the censurae particulares would be of great interest in order to verify 
this; the relevant documents are preserved in the Roman Archives of the Jesuit order (vol. 654, 
Censurae Librarum, t. III, nn. 332 ff.). 
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After publication, the Logica became an influential logical textbook especially 
in England, where it had three editions between 1634 and 1658, and where a circle of 
'Smiglecians' was active during the second half of the century. Curious evidence of the 
book's fortune is the fact that Jonathan Swift had to answer also on Smiglecius' Logica 
during an (unsuccessful) examination in logic at Dublin university in 1685.15 According 
to Pierre Bayle - who devoted an article in his Dictionnaire historique et critique to 
Smiglecius16 - the pages of the Logica 
omnia continere videntur, quae ad naturam operationum intellectus, ad 
vim ratiocinandi, ad fundamenta & principia veritatis pertinent; & si 
ea exceperis quae ipsi inhaerere necesse erat vel falsa vel abstrusiora 
ab ingenio Sectae quam sequebatur, certat in eo soliditas iudicii cum 
subtilitate atque perspicuitate.17 
Let us now take a closer look to the structure of the work. The first disputation, 
and the one we shall focus on in the following sections, deals with entia rationis; 
Smiglecius' choice of opening the book with this topic is clearly connected with the idea 
that an extensive discussion of entia rationis is required in order to deal properly with 
the problem of the nature and the object of logic. Not surprisingly, the second 
disputation (De logica in communi) is devoted to this latter problem. The third 
disputation deals with the first operation of the intellect (the simplex apprehensio) and 
introduces disputations 4-11, discussing the traditional topics of prepraedicamenta and 
praedicamenta. Disputation 12, De secunda operatione intellectus, seu de enunciatione, 
opens the second part of the Logica, and embraces the whole theory of proposition, 
                                            
15 Cf. W. Voisé, The Career... cit., p. 23;  I. Dambaska, Kilks uwag... cit., p. 5. For further 
evidence of the English fortune of Smiglecius' Logica, which may have been among Locke's 
logical sources, cf. E.J. Ashworth, "'Do Words Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic Sources 
of Locke's Theory of Language", in Journal of the History of Philosophy XIX (1981) pp. 299-
326 (reprinted in E.J. Ashworth, Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics, London 1985), p. 304. 
16 Cf. P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, nouvelle édition, Paris 1820-1824 (anastatic 
reprint Genève 1969), t. XIII pp. 338-339. 
17 P. Bayle, Theses philosophicae, in Oeuvres diverses, Den Haag 1731 (anastatic reprint 
Hildesheim 1968), v. 4 p. 133. 
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including the discussion on the meaning of terms. Disputation 13 can thus directly 
proceed to the third operation of the intellect (De tertia operatione intellectus quae 
dicitur discursus), and within it to syllogisms; this leaves the last five disputations free 
for such favourite post-medieval topics as the theory of demonstration (disputations 14-
15), the theory of science (disputations 16-17) and the theory of definition (disputation 
18). 
There are considerable differences in the relative lengths of the various 
disputations, and an interesting feature of Smiglecius' work is the choice of the topics 
that he felt required a more extensive discussion. This is especially evident in the 
treatment of the category of relation (disputation 10), to which are devoted almost two 
hundred pages. One can compare this to the length of the disputations on the other 
categories: 63 pages are devoted to the category of substance (disputation 8), 53 to that 
of quantity (disputation 9), 44 to the joint treatment of quality and of the last six 
categories (disputation 11). This means that the space devoted to the category of 
relation is larger than that devoted to all the other categories put together.18 
The first disputation, on entia rationis, is also one of the longest (95 pages); if 
one considers that the role of entia rationis is also discussed in the second disputation, 
and that the relationes rationis - usually included in the class of entia rationis - are 
discussed at length in the disputation on relations, it will be clear that the entia rationis 
are indeed among Smiglecius' main logical concerns. 
Coming to the second part of the book, Disputation 12, devoted to the theory of 
proposition, deals in 96 pages and 14 questions with the vox (this is the only place in 
which Smiglecius discusses some elements of the traditional theory of terms), the 
difference between noun and verb, the nature of the proposition and the role of the 
copula, the theory of truth and the theory of opposition. No mention is made of the 
theory of supposition, with the exception of the general observation that the voces are 
                                            
18 A similar, peculiar attention to the category of relation was already evident in the 
Commentaria: cf. Martinus Smiglecius, Commentaria cit., vol.  I pp. 239-272. 
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signa suppositiva while the concepts are signa manifestativa.19 None of the questions 
within this disputation deals with such standard topics as the theory of modality and of 
modal propositions20 (but one is devoted to propositions on future contingents). The 
attention paid to the theory of demonstration (165 pages) and to the theory of science 
(254 pages) is impressive, but not surprising in an early seventeenth-century author.21 
 
3. ON WHAT THERE WAS NOT: IMPOSSIBLE ENTITIES AND ENTIA RATIONIS 
The discussion on the ontological status of fictional and impossible entities and 
on the logical status of the terms used to refer to them is an old one.22 During the late-
medieval and post-medieval period, this discussion largely focused - with different 
accents in different authors - on the following, often interrelated problems:  
1) (mainly) semantical problems: a) what kind of suppositio, if any, can be 
attributed to terms 'referring' to fictional and impossible entities? This problem is linked 
to the discussion on the possibility of ampliating (ampliatio) the supposition beyond 
present, past, future and possible beings, so as also to include a fifth class: imaginable 
beings. Are impossible entities to be included in the class of imaginable beings?23 b) 
                                            
19 Martinus Smiglecius, Logica, Ingolstadii 1618, t. II pp. 4-5. On the difference between 
manifestive and suppositive signs - and in general on this section of Smiglecius' logic - cf. E.J. 
Ashworth, 'Do Words Signify... cit., particularly p. 323. The 1658 Oxford edition of the Logica, 
used by Ashworth, has a different pagination from the Ingolstadt edition. 
20 Once again, this also seems to be a feature of the Commentaria, where only a single page is 
devoted to modality: Martinus Smiglecius, Commentaria... cit., vol. 2 p. 69. 
21 For a study on Smiglecius' theory of science cf. L. Nowak, "Marcina Smigleckiego teoria 
nauki", in Studia Philosophiae Christianae XIII (1977) pp. 109-143 and XIV (1978) pp. 49-88: 
Id., "Gnozeologiczne poglady Marcina Smigleckiego", in W. Voisé and Z. Skubala-Tokarskiej, 
Z historii polskiej logiki, Wroclaw 1981, pp. 113-172. 
22 Cf. S. Ebbesen, "The Chimera's Diary", in S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka (ed.), The Logic of 
Being, Dordrecht 1986, pp. 115-143. 
23 The simple fact that the 'fifth' kind of ampliation (to imaginable entities) goes beyond the 
fourth (to possible entities) does not necessarily imply that it should include all kinds of 
impossible entities: one can well conceive the 'possibility' in the fourth kind of ampliation as 
weaker than logical possibility (for instance, as some kind of physical possibility), so that the 
imaginable can be identified with the logically possible. On the ampliatio to imaginable entities 
cf. E.J. Ashworth, "Chimeras and Imaginary obiects: a Study in the Post-Medieval Theory of 
Signification", in Vivarium XV (1977), pp. 57-79, reprinted in Ead., Studies... cit.; J. Biard, "La 
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How do such terms signify? How do they acquire meaning? What kind of meaning do 
they acquire? Are they capable of definition? The common idea was that such terms, 
although lacking any denotation, are indeed meaningful - which differentiates a term 
like chimera from a non-significative term like blytiris. Ockham and Buridan's 
suggestion is that they possess only a nominal, and not a real definition. However, the 
kind of meaning that can be attributed to them is a debated question. Do they signify all 
and only the component parts of their nominal definition? Or do they rather signify all 
entities - which would make any two terms 'referring' to impossible entities 
synonymous? c) What are the truth-conditions of propositions in which radically non-
denoting terms24 appear? Ockham and Buridan took a rather drastic position: all the 
affirmative propositions in which something is predicated of a radically non-denoting 
term are to be considered false, and all the negative propositions in which something is 
denied of a radically non-denoting term are to be considered true. In this way, the 
(identical) proposition chimera est chimera would be regarded as false, and the 
(contradictory) proposition chimera non est chimera would be regarded as true. This 
position, clearly inspired by the need for ontological rigour, was quite popular among 
late medieval logicians, but seems to lose support later: Suárez, for instance, is much 
more liberal towards chimeras, allowing them not only to be themselves (chimera est 
chimera is considered true), but also to be imaginary animals, similar to one another and 
dissimilar from goat-stags, and even susceptible to such complex predications as 
                                                                                                                                
signification d'objets imaginaires dans quelques textes anglais du XIVe siècle (Guillaume 
Heytesbury, Henry Hopton)", in P. O. Lewry (ed.), The Rise of British Logic. Acts of the Sixth 
European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, pp. 265-283; H. Hugonnard-Roche, 
"Analyse sémantique et analyse 'secundum imaginationem' dans la physique parisienne au XIV 
siècle", in S. Caroti (ed.), Studies in Medieval Natural Philosophy, Firenze 1989, pp. 133-153. 
G. Roncaglia, "Utrum impossibile sit significabile: Buridano, Marsilio di Inghen e la chimera", 
in L. Bianchi (ed.), Filosofia e teologia nel trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, 
Turnhout (forthcoming). For a general introduction to the theory of ampliation cf. A. Maierù, 
Terminologia logica della tarda scolastica, Roma 1972, pp. 139-193. 
24 As I have done elsewhere (cf. G. Roncaglia, Utrum impossibile... cit.), here I use the 
expression 'radically non-denoting term' to label those terms to which no reference can be given 
through any of the kinds of ampliatio accepted by the author(s) at issue. 
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privative modal predications (according to him chimera potest esse cecam is also 
true).25 d) A further logical issue raised by the consideration of impossible entities is 
clearly that of the definition and nature of modal terms. Do we have different 'kinds' of 
impossible entities corresponding to different 'kinds' of impossibility (for example, to 
logical impossibility and to physical impossibility)? How do we discriminate between 
possible and impossible entities? 
2) (mainly) ontological problems: a) What kind of existence, if any, should be 
recognized for logically and/or physically impossible entities? This problem was often 
addressed within the context of discussions on the latitudo entis (what kind of entities 
are to be accepted in our ontology? Is there some general sense of 'being' which is 
common to real beings and to such non-beings as privations, negations, fictitious and 
impossible entities?), usually through the consideration of 'diminutive', 'indirect' or 
'improper' forms of being. Since these were often regarded as a product of our 
intellectual activities, epistemological considerations also played a relevant role here. b) 
Which entities are to be regarded as impossible? This question is clearly connected with 
the last of the above-mentioned (mainly) semantical problems; goat-stags and chimeras 
are often - but, as we shall see, not always - prominent members of the class of 
impossibilia. c) Are fictitious and impossible entities to be classified - and how - within 
the Aristotelian table of categories? This problem was usually addressed at the 
beginning or at the end of the discussion of the ten categories. 
3) (mainly) epistemological problems: a) What are the (intellectual and non-
intellectual) powers used in conceiving fictitious and impossible entities? And what are 
                                            
25 Cf. J.P. Doyle, "Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1)", in Vivarium XXV (1987) pp. 47-
75, p. 64, and Id., "Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (2)", in Vivarium XXVI (1988) pp. 
51-72, pp. 51, 54-55. It may be interesting to add a remark to Doyle's considerations: in 
accepting privative modal predications about chimeras, Suárez seems to be more liberal than 
Aquinas: according to the latter, a chimera may be "non videns", but - it seems - not blind. "Non 
videns enim potest dici tam chimera quam lapis quam etiam homo. Sed in privatione est 
quaedam natura vel substantia determinata de qua dicitur privatio: non enim omne non videns 
potest dici caecum (...)": Thomas Aquinas, In IV. Met., 3, 2; cf. R.W. Schmidt, The Domain of 
Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Hague 1966, p. 76. 
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the intentional attitudes we can have towards them? (For instance: can we know 
something impossible? Can we want or desire something impossible?) b) What kind of 
science, if any, can legitimately deal with impossible entities? This problem was 
debated not only with reference to metaphysics but also with reference to logic, thus 
connecting epistemological and logical considerations: are impossible entities to be 
included within the scope of logical discourse? 
The subdivision into (mainly) semantical, ontological and epistemological 
problems is of course a partially artificial one: it is not to be found - at least not in these 
terms - in medieval and post-medieval authors, and it may be difficult to apply in 
concrete situations, since the discussions of the above outlined topics are often strictly 
interrelated and interdependent. Nevertheless, it may help us to shape the general 
theoretical landscape of the problem, a major need while taking into account some 
portion of the vast amount of available and relevant texts, in most cases still to be 
studied. 
From the point of view of the above proposed classification, Smiglecius' 
discussion on entia rationis is more directly connected with ontological and 
epistemological problems, even if it has the ultimate aim of providing the background 
needed in order to answer the question on the object of logic. This latter task provides a 
basis for the inclusion of a section devoted to entia rationis at the very beginning of a 
logical textbook; however, Smiglecius' discussion - as well as most of the post-medieval 
discussions on impossible entities within the 'chapter' devoted to entia rationis - does 
not directly deal with such problems as the ampliation to imaginabilia, the kind of 
supposition possessed by radically non-denoting terms, and the truth-conditions of 
propositions containing them. As a general observation, it may be noted that Smiglecius' 
discussion takes up many of the problems that were debated at his time with reference 
to entia rationis not only in the field of logic but also in that of metaphysics. In 
particular, Suárez' Disputationes Metaphysicae appear to be one of the most important 
12 
of Smiglecius' sources. On the contrary, it seems that the above-mentioned semantical 
and logical problems, still quite popular in the first half of the 16th century26, lose some 
appeal for logicians of the subsequent century.27 
Why were impossible entities included in - or even identified with - the class of 
entia rationis? The story behind this is a complex, and still largely unexplored one. The 
main feature of entia rationis, and one on which there was general agreement among 
medieval and post-medieval authors, is that they only exist in our intellect (where an 
esse obiectivum is usually attributed to them). The fortune of entia rationis in late-
medieval and post-medieval logic is largely due to the authority of Thomas Aquinas, 
and to his view of the object of logic. According to Aquinas, who elaborated his theory 
of entia rationis mainly on the basis of Aristotle's Metaphysics and of Arabic sources, 
there are two fundamental kinds of being, entia rationis and entia naturae, and the 
logician only deals with the former: it is there that we must seek for the proper object of 
logic.28 But what are the entia rationis? If we start with the above-mentioned distinction 
between entia rationis and entia naturae, the term ens rationis covers everything which 
is not an ens naturae. This is a broad meaning, and according to Aquinas it seems that it 
includes at least29 the following: 
* negations (such as "non videns") and privations (such as "caecitas"); 
* fictions, such as chimeras; dreams are also included in this class; 
                                            
26 Cf. E. J. Ashworth, Chimeras... cit. 
27 Note however that the ampliatio to imaginabilia remains a debated issue even later: an 
interesting discussion (and rejection) of it is to be found in Fonseca in 1564 (P. Fonseca, 
Institutionum dialecticarum libri octo, ed. by J. Ferreira Gomes, Coimbra 1964, v. II pp. 726-
728), and near the end of the century it is still mentioned (and apparently accepted) by Suárez 
(F. Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae 54, 2 n. 18). 
28 For some of the relevant passages and a discussion of this theory cf. R.W. Schmidt, The 
Domain... cit., pp. 49-71. On late-medieval and post-medieval theories of entia rationis cf. L. 
Hickman, Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates, München 1980; J.P. Doyle, Suarez on 
Beings of Reason and Truth cit. 
29 Here I will not discuss the problem whether universals such as 'humanity' - which, while 
positively and immediately based on reality, do not exist as such in reality - are also to be 
included in the class of the broadly considered entia rationis. Cf. R.W. Schmidt, The Domain ... 
cit., pp. 75-93. 
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* 'logical' second intentions, such as contrariety, definition, predicate, proposition and 
syllogism; 
* relations of reason, which are not grounded on intrinsic properties of their 
fundamenta. 
Aquinas, however, gives elsewhere a different subdivision of entia rationis 
into two subsets which seem to be considered mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive: negations and relations of reason.30 In speaking of 'negations' Aquinas 
seems to mean here both negations and privations, while there are good grounds for 
including 'logical' intentions in the class of relations of reason.31 As we shall see, the 
inclusion of fictions in this classification remains a debated issue. 
According to Aquinas, therefore, the term ens rationis may cover different 
kinds of 'unreal' being. But in various passages he identifies, among those possible 
meanings, the 'proper' one: 
Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus quas ratio 
adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et 
similium, quae non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem 
rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie 
subiectum logice.32 
                                            
30 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate 21, 1, c. 
31 Cf. R.W. Schmidt, The Domain... cit., pp. 89-93. 
32 Thomas Aquinas, in IV Met., 4, 5; on this and on similar passages cf. R.W. Schmidt, The 
Domain ... cit., pp. 53, 90. 
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The examples given by Aquinas make it clear that here he has in mind those 
which have been labeled 'logical' intentions, even if it may be difficult to give a clear 
definition of them.33 
Most late-medieval and post-medieval logicians drew from this tradition the 
general idea that the class of entia rationis is subdivided into negations, privations and 
relations of reason, and that the most important relations of reason are those 'logical 
intentions' which part of the Thomistic school considered the formal object of logic. 
Given these assumptions, it should come as no surprise that both the discussion of entia 
rationis and that of the category of relation played a very important role for the 
logician: the peculiar attention devoted to them by Smiglecius is therefore fully 
understandable within this tradition. 
The location of fictitious entities within this classification is not always clear, 
but those who emphasize the fact that entities like the chimera result from an impossible 
composition, and are therefore to be considered as logically impossible beings, tend to 
include them in the class of negations. This opinion sometimes coexists with the 
attribution of an autonomous role to fictions: thus, the Complutenses propose a division 
of entia rationis into the three groups of 1) fictions, made up by putting together 
incompossible parts, and lacking any real foundation, 2) privations and negations, taken 
together as having non ens as their proximate foundation, and 3) relations of reason, 
which have as their foundation some positive being.34 In discussing this opinion, 
however, they leave a possibility for the inclusion of fictions in the class of negations: 
                                            
33 Traditionally, 'logical' intentions were identified with those second intentions which, while 
existing only in the intellect, are well-founded through an indirect reference to reality. Cf. R.W. 
Schmidt, The domain of logic... cit., pp. 85-89; P. Doyle, Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth 
(1) cit., p. 67. These criteria, however, may not suffice to precisely select exactly those 
intentions which we wish to include in the class of 'logical' intentions: for an influential 
criticism of the Thomistic approach on this point cf. P. Fonseca, Commentariorum in 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros tomi quatuor, Coloniae 1615 (anastatic reprint 
Hildesheim 1964), t. 1 col. 491. 
34  Cf. Collegii Complutensis (...) Disputationes in Aristotelis Dialecticam, Ludguni 1668 
(anastatic reprint Hildesheim 1977), p. 73. 
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according to the Complutenses, if we take the term 'negation' in its broadest sense "pro 
quocunque non esse", then "etiam fictiones, seu chimerae, quia a parte rei nullum 
habent fundamentum, solent in hoc sensu appellari negationes";35 in a similar way, 
according to Suárez the division of beings of reason into relations of reason and 
negations may be considered adequate "comprendendo sub negatione entia ficta et 
impossibilia".36 The Conimbricenses also give two possible answers to the problem of 
the location of fictitious and impossible entities within entia rationis: we can either 
think that, although properly being entia rationis, they were not included in the above-
mentioned classification because they lack any foundation in reality, or - and this is 
considered the best answer - we can assume that they are to be included in the class of 
negations.37 
The idea that logical intentions are to be considered the most proper kind of 
entia rationis is often not shared in the post-medieval period. Being 'well-grounded' - 
even if only mediately - in reality, logical beings of reason came rather to be seen by 
some authors as a somehow 'improper' (although very important) subset of the class of 
entia rationis. From this point of view, beings of reason in the most proper sense are 
those which have no foundation at all in reality. And this is the place of impossible 
entities. The position of those authors - and Smiglecius, as we shall see, is among them 
- who strongly identify entia rationis and impossible entities, is to be seen as the 
ultimate result of this tendency. In identifying entia rationis and impossible entities, the 
problem remained of how to justify the traditional attribution of the label of entia 
rationis also to other kinds of unreal beings, and especially to logical intentions. The 
usual move was to stress that they are not to be considered beings of reason because of 
                                            
35 Cf. Collegii Complutensis... cit., p. 74 
36 F. Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae 54, 4, n. 10. For a scheme of the resulting 
classification of beings of reason according to Suárez cf. J.P. Doyle, Suarez on Beings of 
Reason and Truth (1) cit., p. 57. 
37 Cf. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e societate Iesu in universam dialecticam 
Aristotelis, Coloniae 1607, anastatic reprint Hildesheim 1976, col. 157. 
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their purely conceptual nature, but rather because they are artificially thought of sub 
modum entis, attributing them a form of being which they cannot possibly possess. 
 
4. ENTIA RATIONIS IN SMIGLECIUS' LOGICA 
First of all, I wish to stress that here I do not deal with Smiglecius' opinion on 
whether entia rationis are to be considered or not the proper object of logic - a problem 
which is addressed in the second disputation of Smiglecius' Logica - but only with his 
discussion on what entia rationis are.38 This discussion is the subject of the first 
disputation, that opens with the obviously fundamental question quid sit ens rationis? 
The first answer given is the traditional one: beings of reason are those which 
are not (either actually or potentially) real beings, but only exist in the intellect.39 They 
can be considered both with reference to their opposition to real beings and with 
reference to their proper mode of being in the intellect. In the first case, we can observe 
that the concept of ens rationis does not entail the negation of every feature of the ens 
reale, since the ens rationis is also a being, though 'in its own way'.40 We are here at the 
very core of the first of our (mainly) ontological problems. The idea that there is a sense 
of 'being' which is common to real beings and to beings of reason (even when they are 
identified with impossible beings) is not new,41 and at the end of the 17th century was 
to lead another Eastern European Jesuit, Maximilian Wietrowski, to the quite explicit 
                                            
38 It may be appropriate, however, to recall here that according to Smiglecius the answer to the 
question "An ens rationis directivum operationum sit obiectum logicae" (disputation 2, question 
3) is that "longe probabilius est ens rationis directivum non esse obiectum formale logicae, sed 
operationes ipsas ut dirigibiles": M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 135. 
39 "Hoc enim nome entis rationis intelligimus, quod cum non sit ens reale, in solo intellectu 
existit. (...) Ad rationem igitur entis rationis requiritur, ut nullo modo sit reale, nec actu, nec 
potentia": Ivi, p. 2. 
40 "Est enim suo modo ens", Ibid. 
41 For its presence in Suárez, cf. P. Doyle, Suarez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1) cit., p. 55 
n. 51. In the medieval period, Aquinas' distinction between ens rationis and ens naturae was 
also used by some authors to deny any opposition between ens rationis and ens reale, insofar as 
both ens rationis and ens naturae were seen as the subdivisions of ens reale: cf. R. Lambertini, 
"Resurgant Entia Rationis. Matthaeus de Augubio on the Object of Logic", in Cahiers de 
l'institut du Moyen-Age Grec et Latin LIX, 1989, pp. 3-60, p. 19. 
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observation that "sicut datur conceptus quidditativus entis realis et entis impossibilis, ita 
etiam datur conceptus entis abstrahentis a possibili seu reali et impossibili, qui 
conceptus vocatur ens supertrascendentale".42 According to Smiglecius, the opposition 
between the ens reale and the ens rationis is therefore not grounded on the fact that the 
ens rationis is not a form of being, but rather on the fact that it is by definition a being 
which is not, and cannot possibly be, an ens reale. Therefore, a being of reason is, 
according to Smiglecius, only one whose essence implies the impossibility of its real 
existence ("quod habet talem essentiam, cui repugnet in re existere"43). If we take the 
term 'impossible' to mean that which cannot have real existence, then the entia rationis 
are identified with impossible beings. The impossibility which is at issue here is 
therefore limited to external reality (beings of reason can have intellectual reality); 
nevertheless, it is a logical, rather than a physical, impossibility. Smiglecius is quite 
clear on this point: 
Voco autem impossibile non id quod potentiae creatae est impossibile, 
sed quod universim omni potentiae tam creatae quam increatae est 
impossibile, seu quod per nullam omnino potentiam fieri potest, eo 
quod implicet contradictionem.44 
The examples given are interesting: the traditional golden mountain is not, 
according to Smiglecius, a being of reason, since, although being impossible 
naturaliter, it is possible through God's absolute power.45 The goat-stag, however, is 
logically impossible, because it would imply the composition of the two essences of 
goat and stag in a single essence: but those essences, pertaining to two different species, 
                                            
42 Maximillian Wietrowski, Philosophia disputata, Pragae 1697, p. 232, cit. in P. Doyle, Suarez 
on Beings of Reason and Truth (1) cit., p. 56. 
43 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 3. 
44 Ivi, pp. 4-5. 
45 The flying donkey should also be added to the golden mountain in the list of traditional 
fictitious entities which are classified by Smiglecius as possible through God's absolute power: 
cf. Ivi, p. 10. 
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entail contradictory differences, and are therefore incompatible.46 Suárez drew a similar 
distinction between the possible golden mountain and the impossible chimera.47 The 
idea that such ficta as goat-stags and chimeras are logically impossible because of their 
involving incompatible essences is not new - Buridan even used this feature to define 
the chimera as that animal which is "compositum ex incompossibilibus componi ad 
invicem"48 - and in adopting it Smiglecius shows his debt to the late-medieval logical 
discussion of impossible entities. This approach was not shared by some of Smiglecius' 
contemporaries: Bartholomaeus Keckermann, for instance, included both the mons 
aureus and the chimera in the class of ficta possibilia, labeling them as bonae 
phantasiae.49 
An interesting problem, given the observation that the modal term 'impossible' 
is used by Smiglecius with reference to real existence and not to conceptual existence, 
is whether there is something that is impossible in such a way that it cannot exist either 
in reality or in the intellect. The way in which Smiglecius distinguishes two possible 
meanings of the term 'impossible' seems to leave open the way to conceptual 
impossibilities: 
Impossibile aliquid dicitur dupliciter: vel quod non possit in re 
existere, vel quod non possit in ratione existere.50 
                                            
46 "Nam etsi tam Hircus quam Cervus sint secundum se Entia realia, tamen composito ex Hirco 
& Cervo in unam essentiam non est realis quin potius realiter impossibilis, eo quod 
contradictionem implicet, eandem rem esse Hircum & Cervum", Ivi, p. 5. 
47 Cf. F. Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae 54, 2, n. 18. 
48 Johannes Buridanus, In Metaphysicen Aristotelis Questiones, Venetiis 1518, Unveränderten 
Nachdruck Frankfurt a.M. 1964, f.23vb; on Buridan's definition of the chimera cf. G. Roncaglia, 
Utrum impossibile sit significabile cit. 
49 Cf. G. Roncaglia, "Buone e cattive fantasie: la riflessione sugli enti inesistenti nella logica di 
Bartholomaeus Keckermann", in Metaxù n. 13, maggio 1992, pp. 80-104. 
50 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 5. 
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However, a few lines later it is made clear that this second class should be 
regarded as empty, or, at least, that the intellect (our intellect?) cannot conceive it 
except as empty: 
Quod si dicas: etiam ratio iudicat impossibilia esse impossibilia, 
respondeo: iudicat esse impossibilia ad existendum in re, non autem 
ad existendum in intellectu; imo iudicat impossibilia omnia posse ab 
intellectu cognosci, quod est, posse existere in intellectu.51 
This position may be difficult to reconcile with Aquinas' view according to 
which we can neither conceive nor imagine in any form those non-entities whose 
definitions entail the impossibility of being realized: 
Aliquid dicitur non ens dupliciter, uno modo, quia non esse cadit in 
definitione eius, sicut caecitas dicitur non ens; et talis non entis non 
potest concipi aliqua forma neque in intellectu neque in imaginatione; 
et huiusmodi non ens est malum; alio modo, quia non invenitur in 
rerum natura, quamvis ipsa privatio entitatis non claudatur in eius 
definitione; et sic nihil prohibet imaginari non entia, et eorum formas 
concipere.52 
It should be observed, however, that in disputation 3, question 2 Smiglecius 
adopts a position closer to Aquinas' own, holding that "non ens secundum se a nullo 
intellectu, sive creato sive increato, apprehendi potest".53 This seems to imply that 
impossible entities are not to be considered non ens simpliciter: a position which may 
agree with the afore-mentioned considerations on the fact that, according to Smiglecius, 
entia rationis are a kind of being. 
It is also interesting to observe that Aquinas - who writes before Ockham and 
Buridan's sharp attack on the logical possibility of chimeras - seems to include both the 
golden mountain and the chimera in the latter class, conceiving them as logically 
                                            
51 Ivi, p. 6. 
52 Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate 3, 4, ad 6. 
53 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 208. 
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possible.54 The different position adopted by Smiglecius seems again to testify the 
influence of the late-medieval debate on impossible entities. 
A last problem dealt with in this first question is whether the opposition 
between the ens reale and the ens rationis is such as to admit the possibility of a 
medium. Smiglecius takes into account as a possible candidate for such a role the ens in 
voluntate. The discussion on whether the will can have an ens rationis (or something 
similar to it) as its object is a traditional one.55 The argument described by Smiglecius 
runs as follows: if we want something impossible, such as (for a man) to be an angel, 
then the object of our will is not real (since it is impossible), and it is formaliter in our 
will rather than in our intellect: therefore, it is neither an ens reale nor an ens rationis. 
The argument is however rejected: the impossible object of our will "licet qua volitum 
respiciat voluntatem, tamen qua ens respicit intellectum".56 The same problem is dealt 
with more extensively in the sixth question, "utrum solum ab intellectu an vero etiam ab 
aliis potentiis ens rationis fieri possit", and Smiglecius' answer is again the traditional 
one: only the intellect is capable of producing entia rationis.57  
The second question is devoted to the problem "an ens rationis consistat in 
coniunctione impossibili plurium rerum", and offers a good example of the modal 
interest of Smiglecius' discussion of entia rationis. The debated issue is an intriguing 
one: are impossible beings (and therefore entia rationis) all obtained through 
composition, or are there also simple impossible beings? Smiglecius first gives 
arguments for the latter position: negations and relations of reasons are usually included 
in the class of entia rationis; however, both of them are simple, and do not require any 
                                            
54 Cf. G. Roncaglia, Buone e cattive fantasie... cit., pp. 90-91. 
55 Scotus' theory according to which the will may produce a relatio rationis (Iohannes Duns 
Scotus, Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum, dist. 45 q. unica) was often mentioned as the 
main authority for this idea; Cf. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis cit., col. 152; Collegii 
Complutensis... cit., pp. 69-70. 
56 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 8. 
57 Ivi, p. 51. For a somehow similar defence of the same position cf. F. Suárez, Disputationes 
Metaphysicae 54, 2, 17-18. 
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composition. Furthermore, our vis fingendi is capable of producing simple impossible 
fictions, and this is done through the first operation of the intellect: if all impossible 
beings were to be regarded as composite, then all entia rationis would depend only 
upon the second operation of the intellect. The last consideration is that impossible 
beings can also result from an impossible division (divisio impossibilis), separating in 
the intellect something that cannot possibly be separated in reality, such as God's 
attributes. 
According to Smiglecius, the main argument for the opposite position is that 
our intellect "nihil posse apprehendere, nisi vel reale, vel similitudinem entis realis". 
This implies that the first operation of the intellect cannot handle impossible beings: all 
the entia rationis should therefore be considered composite. The defenders of this view 
have a single answering strategy to the arguments given by the supporters of simple 
impossibilia: in all the proposed cases a hidden composition is involved. Privations and 
negations are entia rationis only insofar as they are considered sub similitudine entis, 
and it is this way of conceiving them which entails a form of incompossibility. The 
impossibility is then the result of a composition of something which only pertains to 
real beings with something that is not a being at all. The same is true of the relations of 
reason, which are to be regarded as entia rationis insofar as our intellect conceives them 
"per modo aliarum relationum realium". 
A further, strictly logical argument is given to support the composite nature of 
impossible beings: impossible is what implies a contradiction; but  
implicatio contradictionis esse non potest, nisi ubi sunt plura 
incompossibilia, ita ut ex uno sequatur rem esse, ex alio non posse. 
Verbi gratia, in hac propositione, Asinus est rationalis, implicatur 
contradictio, quia duo sunt incompossibilia, asinus & rationale, & ex 
uno sequitur quod asinus sit rationalis, ex altero (quia asinus) quod 
non sit rationalis. Necesse igitur est, ens rationis constare ex 
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incompossibilibus; ac proinde non esse quid simplex sed compositum, 
cum res omnino simplex non possit implicare contradictionem.58 
Here the main point is the following: in order to have a contradiction we 
should have ultimate fundamenta for both sides of it. Those fundamenta should be 
different (otherwise they would be unable to ground a contradiction). Since every 
impossibility results from a contradiction, there can be impossibility only when there is 
some kind of composition. 
In order not to deny that the first operation of the intellect can produce 
impossible entities, the supporters of the composite nature of entia rationis may 
distinguish between two kinds of composition: discursive composition on the one hand, 
and simple composition "ex parte obiecti, quae fit per apprehensionem (...) absque ulla 
affirmatione & negatione",59 on the other. This second composition can also be present 
in the first operation of the intellect, and it suffices to ground an impossibility. 
Concerning those entia rationis resulting from division rather than from 
composition, it is observed that here the impossibility results from re-attributing the 
products of the division to the original subject (in the given example, from re-attributing 
to God his attributes once they have been artificially separated). The impossibility, 
therefore,  follows again from a form of composition. 
This is the position of the supporters of the composite nature of every 
impossible being. Smiglecius, however, seems to be dissatisfied with it, since he goes 
on to adopt once more the opposite and communis opinion, marked in the margin as 
sententia Auctoris, and to give counter-arguments in favour of simple impossible 
beings. The main one is that any relation - including the relations of reason, which are 
entia rationis and which are impossible in re - "est quid simplex in sua essentia, quam 
accipit a fundamento & termino". Therefore, relations of reason constitute an example 
of simple impossible being. As to the 'logical' argument according to which anything 
                                            
58 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I pp. 11-12. 
59 Ivi, p. 13. 
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which implies a contradiction cannot be simple, since it should offer separate 
foundations for both sides of the contradiction, Smiglecius' answer is that 
Nec vero necesse est ut id quod implicat contradictionem semper 
componatur ex duobus quae fundent partes contradictionis, sed sine 
compositione potest fundari contradictio. Nam si aliquam relationem 
poni a parte rei implicet contradictionem, ea contradictio potest 
fundari in suppositione extrinseca relationi. V.G. si supponatur relatio 
rationis existere realiter, sequitur eam & esse ens rationis ob suam 
essentiam, & non esse ens rationis ex suppositione, quia realiter 
ponitur existere. Addo posse aliquid concipi tanquam impossibile, etsi 
non concipiatur implicatio contradictionis, sed solum defectus aliquis 
essentialis, vel si concipiatur, concipietur tanquam quid consequens 
impossibilitatem absolutam.60 
Smiglecius' answer presupposes that the simple act of positing a merely 
intentional object of our reason (for instance, a relation of reason) as having not only 
intentional but also real being, does not imply a 'composition' between the form which 
is proper to the being of reason and the form of real being. 
The third question deals with the problem of whether entia rationis are to be 
seen as concepts or as extrinsic denominations. Extrinsic denominations are those which 
are drawn not from a form inherent in the denominated object, but from a form inherent 
in something else - typically, in the knowing or perceiving subject. In this way, we say 
of something, e.g. a wall, that it is 'seen' or 'conceived'. Now, if the only kind of being 
attributed to the entia rationis is that of being conceived, it seems to follow that they 
should be considered extrinsic denominations (that is, as denominated only through our 
act of conceiving them). The opposite is true if a 'stronger' form of being is attributed to 
them - for instance some kind of esse diminutum or esse fictum, on the grounds of which 
they can also possess intrinsic forms. If this esse fictum is seen as a form of conceptual 
being, then the entia rationis should perhaps be regarded as concepts. 
                                            
60 Ivi, p. 16. 
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The discussion of this problem is quite common among post-medieval authors; 
Smiglecius' own solution is interesting as it shows how seriously he takes the 
implications of giving to the entia rationis an intentional being: in his opinion, entia 
rationis are neither extrinsic denominations nor concepts, but are rather the objects of 
denominations and concepts. It should be stressed that the problem at issue here is one 
of great relevance not only from the ontological and epistemological points of view, but 
also from the semantical one61. Smiglecius' theory, although not explicitly dealing with 
such (mainly) semantical problems as the kind of supposition to be attributed to 
radically non-denoting terms, has clear consequences as regards the referential import 
of these terms: not only do they have a meaning, but they also seem to have a 
denotation, albeit within a domain of intentional objects. According to Smiglecius, the 
entia rationis cannot be concepts, because concepts qua concepts should have an 
adequate object of which they are similitudines: 
Respondeo, obiectum neque ut res neque ut obiectum esse idem cum 
conceptu, quia conceptus est similitudo obiecti. Obiectum vero est res 
ipsa & essentia, cuius similitudo est conceptus: numquam autem res 
est idem quod sua similitudo.62 
The fact that entia rationis only exist when they are thought of, does not imply 
that they are simple concepts, but rather that they only have objective being in the 
intellect:  
Ens rationis non est conceptus formatus ab intellectu, sed id de quo 
conceptus formatur, quod quia non existit, nisi quando de eo formatur 
conceptus, idcirco dicitur habere obiectivum tantum esse in 
intellectu.63 
                                            
61 On the interrelations between ontological, epistemological and semantical levels in the post-
medieval discussion of entia rationis cf. L. Hickman, Modern Theories... cit. 
62 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 21. 
63 Ivi, p. 22. 
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A fortiori beings of reason cannot be purely extrinsic denominations: the 
essence of an ens rationis like the goat-stag is not given by its being conceived, but by 
its being a (fictitious) entity obtained through the (impossible) conjunction of the 
essences of goat and stag. The extrinsic denomination 'conceived' finds in the goat-stag 
its object, and cannot be identified with it. 
The fourth question further investigates the way in which entia rationis can be 
considered a product of the intellect.64 Again, the nature of intentional object attributed 
to them by Smiglecius is quite clear from his description of this 'production': 
Modus igitur quo fit ens rationis ab intellectu est iste. Intellectus per 
actionem realem intelligendi producit in se cognitionem obiecti, quae 
cognitio est expressa quaedam similitudo obiecti, estque qualitas 
quaedam in intellectu producta; haec porro qualitas, cum sit 
repraesentativa obiecti, facit obiectum esse praesens intellectui: ex illa 
enim repraesentatione oritur praesentia obiecti in intellectu. (...) Haec 
actio productiva entis rationis dicitur a quibusdam actio intentionalis, 
quia per eam tendit intellectus in obiectum cognitum.65 
What differentiates the objective being proper to a being of reason from that 
proper to a real being qua known, is that the former is obiective tantum, and only exists 
when the intellect conceives it. However, as already stressed, the ens rationis exists as 
the object of the act of conceiving: it is 'produced' by this act, but it cannot be identified 
with it. Smiglecius rejects the idea that the act of conceiving should presuppose the 
conceived object: in the case of entia rationis, "non repugnat obiectum cognoscendo 
fieri".66 The two moments of the production and of the knowledge of the object - 
although being in re the same - can however be distinguished by reason.67 The same 
problem is further elaborated in the fifth question - "Utrum ens rationis tunc fiat quando 
cognoscitur" - whose main conclusion is that "non prius fieri ens rationis quam 
                                            
64 On Smiglecius' positions on this topic cf. L. Nowak, Gnozeologiczne... cit., pp. 135-141. 
65 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 26. 
66 Ivi, p. 31. 
67 Ivi, p. 33. 
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cognoscatur, nec prius cognosci quam fiat, sed cognoscendo produci, & producendo 
cognosci".68 
Of the remaining questions, special mention must be made of question 8, which 
displays some theological implications of the discussion of entia rationis, and question 
10, which is devoted to their classification. The former deals with the problem "Utrum 
divinus intellectus cognoscat & faciat Ens rationis". In addressing it, Smiglecius deals 
with a theological problem which seems to have been the subject of much debate in the 
post-medieval period:69 is it possible to attribute to God a direct knowledge of such an 
'imperfect' form of being as that proper to entia rationis, without endangering his 
perfection? In order to understand the importance of this problem, one should not only 
take into account that such entia rationis as negations, privations and impossibilia are 
affected by the ontological imperfection connected with their lack of being, but that the 
very concept of malum was traditionally considered a kind of privation. It is on these 
ground, for instance, that relevant considerations on the ontological status of non-
existent entities are included in Aquinas' De veritate within the question "Utrum malum 
habeat ideam in Deo".70 After a long discussion of the problem, Smiglecius concludes 
that God's knowledge of entia rationis is only mediate, "in ordine ad intellectum 
nostrum".71 This means that God does not directly know (and therefore does not 
directly produce) entia rationis, but rather conceives them as being produced by the 
human intellect.  
As already mentioned, question 10 deals with the subdivision of the class of 
entia rationis ("Quot sint genera entium rationis"), and is therefore of special interest. 
                                            
68 Ivi, p. 45. 
69 An influential discussion is in F. Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae 54, 2, 19-24; the 
position adopted by Smiglecius is not the one defended by Suárez, but one which Suárez 
mentions and judges 'non improbabilis', apparently considering it as a variant of his own: cf. Ivi, 
54, 2, 24. 
70 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, 3. 4. 
71 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 63. 
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According to Smiglecius, the first and more general subdivision is between those entia 
rationis which lack and those which have a foundation in re. The first group is that of 
mere fictions, while the second one is characterized by having "fundamentum aliquod in 
re, quod quasi exigat illam fictionem".72 The latter is the case of the 'logical' beings of 
reason, and it is interesting to observe that Smiglecius includes in this class not only, as 
was usually done, the logically relevant relations of reason, but also negations and 
privations. To understand the meaning of this move it may be useful to consider the 
examples given in question 11 ("An denominationes logicae sint vere entia rationis"), 
the very last of this first disputation.73 Here Smiglecius informs us that while esse 
praedicatum is an example of a relative being of reason, esse abstractum is an example 
- or rather the example - of a negative one.  
Since - as we have seen - according to Smiglecius only logically impossible 
beings can be considered entia rationis, in order to include in this class the 'logical' 
being of reason he is drawn to add a condition: 
tam relationem quam negationem & privationem tunc solum esse entia 
rationis, cum coniunguntur aliquo modo impossibili, vel in seipsis 
cum concipiuntur per modum entium cum non sint entia, vel respectu 
subiecti, cum ei tribuuntur, cui non conveniunt nec convenire possunt, 
quare si modus impossibilis desit, tam negatio quam relatio erit suo 
modo realis.74 
The strategy adopted here is the one we have already mentioned in the third 
section of this paper: as a consequence of the growing emphasis on the impossibility 
attributed to a being of reason, the need was felt to characterize as impossibilia also 
                                            
72 Ivi, p. 75. 
73 The disputation closes with a concluding "Explicatio aliquot difficultatum de entibus 
rationis" (pp. 86-95), which takes up again some of the issues debated in the preceding 
questions. Although this section does not seem to add anything really new, the cautious way in 
which Smiglecius often expresses himself here (for example on the problem of the possibility of 
God's directly conceiving the entia rationis) may suggest a link between these pages and the 
censurae addressed to the first redaction of the Logica: an hypothesis, however, that would 
require a detailed study of the censurae particulares to be confirmed. 
74 M. Smiglecius, Logica cit., t. I p. 78. 
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'logical' beings of reason - and this was done through reference to the fact that they are 
conceived sub modum entis. It seems that, in order to have at hand his own object of 
study - and even to conceive it - the logician should necessarily make an 'ontological 
mistake', by taking it as if it were a real being. Only in this way do 'logical' intentions 
come to be constituted as entia rationis, and can Aquinas' claim that entia rationis are 
the proper object of logic be reaffirmed. 
